什么是 pincer？

pincer 是开发人员利用 Openclaw Skills 的关键安全层。虽然智能体技能提供了巨大的能力，但它们也可能成为恶意软件或提示词注入攻击的载体。该工具封装了标准的安装过程，在执行任何操作之前对源代码和元数据进行深度分析。通过集成 mcp-scan 和自定义模式检测等工具，它降低了与第三方技能采用相关的风险，并保护本地环境免受恶意负载的侵害。

下载入口:https://github.com/openclaw/skills/tree/main/skills/panzacoder/pincer

安装与下载

1. ClawHub CLI

从源直接安装技能的最快方式。

2. 手动安装

将技能文件夹复制到以下位置之一

优先级：工作区 > 本地 > 内置

3. 提示词安装

将此提示词复制到 OpenClaw 即可自动安装。

Install

pincer 应用场景

• 通过实时风险评估和恶意软件检测，安全地从 ClawHub 安装新技能。
• 审计现有的 Openclaw Skills，以识别本地库中以前未检测到的威胁或可疑更新。
• 在向社区发布之前，扫描本地技能开发目录以查找安全漏洞。
• 管理与特定发布者的信任关系，以自动化安全安装，同时拦截已知的恶意行为者。

1. 用户通过 pincer CLI 发起安装或扫描命令。
2. pincer 从 ClawHub 或本地目录获取目标技能的元数据和源代码。
3. 它执行 mcp-scan 以检测提示词注入、工具污染和敏感数据泄露风险。
4. 二次模式匹配引擎检查混淆的负载，如 Base64 命令、十六进制负载或已知的恶意软件传递方法。
5. 该工具根据用户定义的信任级别和存在时长阈值，评估发布者的声誉和技能统计数据。
6. pincer 生成风险评估（CLEAN、CAUTION、DANGER 或 MALWARE），并根据结果继续安装或拦截操作。

pincer 配置指南

# 通过 ClawHub 安装 pincer
clawhub install pincer

# 确保已安装必要的依赖项
brew install uv jq

# 将本地 bin 添加到您的 PATH 以实现全局访问
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

pincer 数据架构与分类体系

pincer 在用户的主目录中管理其配置和历史记录，以跟踪受信任的实体和安装日志。

name: pincer
description: Security-first wrapper for installing agent skills. Scans for malware, prompt injection, and suspicious patterns before installation. Use instead of `clawhub install` for safer skill management.
homepage: https://github.com/panzacoder/pincer
metadata:
  openclaw:
    emoji: "??"
    requires:
      bins: ["pincer"]
    install:
      - id: symlink
        kind: script
        label: "Install pincer to PATH"
        script: |
          chmod +x "${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/pincer.sh"
          mkdir -p ~/.local/bin
          ln -sf "${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/pincer.sh" ~/.local/bin/pincer
          echo ""
          echo "? pincer installed!"
          echo ""
          echo "Make sure ~/.local/bin is in your PATH:"
          echo '  export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"'
          echo ""
          echo "Usage:"
          echo "  pincer install   # Safe install with scanning"
          echo "  pincer scan      # Scan without installing"
          echo "  pincer audit            # Scan all installed skills"
          echo ""

pincer ???

Security-first wrapper for clawhub install. Scans skills for malware, prompt injection, and suspicious patterns before installation.

Why?

Agent skills are powerful — they're basically executable documentation. The ClawHub ecosystem has already seen malware campaigns distributing infostealers via innocent-looking skills. pincer adds a security layer before you install anything.

Install

# From ClawHub
clawhub install pincer

# Or manually
chmod +x ./scripts/pincer.sh
ln -sf "$(pwd)/scripts/pincer.sh" ~/.local/bin/pincer

Dependencies:

• clawhub — for fetching skills
• uvx — for mcp-scan (brew install uv)
• jq — for JSON parsing

Usage

Safe Install

# Instead of: clawhub install some-skill
pincer install some-skill

# With specific version
pincer install some-skill@1.2.0

Scan Without Installing

# Scan a ClawHub skill
pincer scan some-skill

# Scan a local directory
pincer scan ./path/to/skill

# JSON output for automation
pincer scan some-skill --json

Audit Installed Skills

# Quick-scan all installed skills
pincer audit

# JSON output
pincer audit --json

Manage Trust

# Add trusted publisher (auto-approve clean skills)
pincer trust add steipete

# Remove from trusted
pincer trust remove old-publisher

# Block a publisher or skill
pincer trust block suspicious-dev
pincer trust block malware-skill

# Unblock
pincer trust unblock redeemed-dev

# List all trust settings
pincer trust list

View History

# See what you've installed
pincer history

# JSON output
pincer history --json

Configuration

# Show current config
pincer config show

# Edit in $EDITOR
pincer config edit

# Reset to defaults
pincer config reset

What It Checks

Via mcp-scan (Invariant Labs)

• Prompt injection attacks
• Malware payloads in natural language
• Tool poisoning
• Sensitive data exposure
• Hard-coded secrets

Additional Pattern Detection

Publisher & Provenance

• Publisher reputation (trusted list)
• Download count threshold
• Skill age threshold
• Blocklist checking

Binary Detection

• Scans for bundled executables
• Flags Mach-O, ELF, PE32 binaries

Risk Levels

Configuration

Config: ~/.config/pincer/config.json

{
  "trustedPublishers": ["openclaw", "steipete", "invariantlabs-ai"],
  "blockedPublishers": [],
  "blockedSkills": [],
  "autoApprove": "clean",
  "logInstalls": true,
  "minDownloads": 0,
  "minAgeDays": 0
}

Examples

Clean Install

$ pincer install bird
??? pincer v1.0.0

  → Fetching bird from ClawHub...
  Publisher: steipete (trusted)
  Stats: 7363 downloads · 27 ★ · created 1 month ago

??? pincer Scanning bird...

  → Running mcp-scan...
  ? mcp-scan: passed
  → Checking for suspicious patterns...
  ? Pattern check: passed
  → Checking external URLs...
  ? URL check: passed
  → Checking for bundled binaries...
  ? Binary check: passed

Risk Assessment:
  ? CLEAN — No issues detected

  → Auto-approved (clean + trusted config).
  → Installing bird...
  ? Installed successfully!

Dangerous Skill Blocked

$ pincer install sketchy-tool
??? pincer v1.0.0

  → Fetching sketchy-tool from ClawHub...
  Publisher: newaccount (unknown)
  Stats: 12 downloads · 0 ★ · created 2 days ago

??? pincer Scanning sketchy-tool...

  → Running mcp-scan...
  ?? mcp-scan: high-risk warnings
  → Checking for suspicious patterns...
  ?? Pattern check: suspicious patterns found
    ? curl/wget piped to shell
    ? macOS quarantine removal (xattr)
  → Checking external URLs...
  ?? URL check: external URLs found
    ? http://sketchy-domain.xyz/install
  → Checking for bundled binaries...
  ? Binary check: passed

Risk Assessment:
  ?? DANGER — Suspicious patterns detected
    ? mcp-scan: high-risk patterns detected
    ? curl/wget piped to shell
    ? macOS quarantine removal (xattr)

  ?? Install blocked. Use --force to override (not recommended).

Credits

• mcp-scan by Invariant Labs — core security scanning
• 1Password Security Research — threat analysis that inspired this tool
• Snyk ToxicSkills Report — ecosystem threat research

License

MIT

Stay safe out there. ???